What is on the aircraft, read over ADB (2026-10-02)
A read-only survey with root, while the drone sat on a bench with props off. Everything here was observed on the live unit; where it is inference it says so. Identifying values (serials, MACs, coordinates, SSIDs) were deliberately not transcribed.
First: the survey changed the device, and how
Section titled “First: the survey changed the device, and how”/etc/ld.so.preload contains /usr/lib/libcrashdump.so, which is preloaded
into every dynamically linked process, busybox applets included, and it
treats SIGPIPE as a fatal crash. So every producer | head writes a ~350 KB
crash report to the eMMC.
The crash store was genuinely empty before this session and now holds 11
reports, about 3.5 MB, created between 00:49 and 00:59 uptime. Ten are ls
(from a /proc/*/fd walk), one is sort (from du | sort | head). eMMC use
went 17.2 MB to 21.2 MB. Switching to | tail and head -n FILE stopped it.
They were left in place because deleting is a write.
Working rule for this device: never pipe into head.
Two consequences worth holding onto. The drone reports the growing count over
ARSDK as MassStorage content changed, so a controller watching crash-log count
sees our mistakes as if they were the aircraft’s. And mcbebop’s shell tool
leaves a persistent trail in /data/home/root/.ash_history (our sentinel
strings are in there), while ADB’s shell does not.
/factory: per-unit production data, not in the firmware image
Section titled “/factory: per-unit production data, not in the firmware image”The find of the survey. A separate read-only UBI volume, 17 files, absent from
the PLF. It holds this aircraft’s own factory test records from Parrot’s line
BB36-2, 2016-07-14, every station RESULT_OK.
| File | Bytes | What |
|---|---|---|
FVT1_MB.txt |
17754 | mainboard: P7MU OTP fuse programming, FLASH CYPRESS (the motor controller is flashed here), DDR bitflip test, MAC and PCB-serial writes |
FVT2.txt |
5089 | thermal calibration, and FORMAT EMMC |
FVT3.txt |
12503 | two-axis motorised rate table IMU calibration, then UPLOAD FACTORY CALIBRATION |
FVT4_CAM.txt |
11646 | camera, LED, fan, button |
FVT5_RF.txt |
9573 | GPS simulator, Wi-Fi 2.4/5 GHz, antenna |
FVT6_US.txt |
4319 | ultrasound, UPDATE THRESHOLD CURVES |
FVT7.txt |
10512 | per-motor tests and PROPELLER SPIN DIRECTION CHECK |
FVT8.txt |
15156 | a real test flight: OPEN TELNET CONNECTION, KILL DRAGON, TRANSFER FLIGHT DATAFILE, CHECK FLIGHT PHASES, WOBBLE SCORE COMPUTING |
Thermal_IMU_bias.fact.csv |
534 | per-unit IMU thermal model |
Thermal_IMU_ortho.fact.csv |
417 | per-unit scale and orthogonality |
camera_{front,vert}_parameters.txt |
22 / 21 | |
serial.txt, pcb_serial.txt, mac_address.txt |
identifiers, not transcribed |
Every Bebop 2 was flown and scored for wobble before it shipped, and the factory’s own access path was telnet, the same door we used.
The thermal CSVs are directly usable: Temp_Min_Max 27.824 65.001, 4-term
polynomials in temperature for gyro and accel bias per axis, scale-factor errors
(gyro 1.0028 / 1.0070 / 1.0147, accel 1.0010 / 0.9996 / 1.0050), and cross-axis
terms that are all zero, so the factory never measured cross-axis coupling.
The live gyro at 50 °C sits inside the calibrated band.
This answers “is there per-unit calibration?” properly. The radio NVM is a generic template, but the IMU calibration genuinely is per-unit, and it lives here rather than anywhere the firmware image could show.
The flight counter is not in the filesystem
Section titled “The flight counter is not in the filesystem”48 flights, last 20 s, 7946 s total (2 h 12 m 26 s), averaging about 2 m 45 s.
It arrives in the log tagged Motor* alongside the motor-controller firmware
version, so the counter lives in the Cypress PSoC’s own NVRAM, not in any
file. That is why no filesystem search would have found it, and why the empty
navdata/ is not a contradiction: persist.dragon-prog.navdata_tlm: 0 and
persist.nmea.record: 0 mean Linux was never asked to keep a flight log.
The empty-media question has a strong lead
Section titled “The empty-media question has a strong lead”/tmp/.mmc_tuning.txt is a tune2fs -l of the eMMC and reports Lifetime writes: 1424 MB against 21 MB resident. So 1.4 GB passed through that
filesystem at some point: media was recorded and later offloaded or deleted,
rather than never recorded. Which of those is answerable only from the previous
owner’s August 2018 log, which was deliberately not read.
Boot and update history
Section titled “Boot and update history”/data/updater/updater_bootcount.log = 15 boots. updater.log has the
whole story: shipped on 4.3.1; at boot 3 it found a .plf in /update, ran
updater_prolog.sh, rebooted, and at boot 4 logged Update success to version 4.7.1. Boots 5 to 14 are no-op scans. The updater scans the FTP-writable
media root for firmware on every boot.
Security posture, stated plainly
Section titled “Security posture, stated plainly”Three write-enabled anonymous FTP roots, all as root (ftpd -wS from
/etc/inetd.conf): port 21 to /data/ftp, port 61 to the flightplans
directory, and port 51 to /update, which is the exact directory the
boot-time updater scans for *.plf. dragon.conf has wifi_passphrase: "",
so the access point is open.
Taken together: anyone within radio range can write a firmware image to the
drone’s update directory. Nothing here is exploited or recommended; it is
recorded because it is the aircraft’s weakest point by a wide margin, and it is
why mcbebop does not expose port 51.
Runtime picture
Section titled “Runtime picture”117 processes, 297 MB usable RAM (206 MB of the reservation is one avicam
DMA region), / is read-only ubifs at 85%, so nothing on it can differ from
the extracted image. Writable storage is /data (9 MB, 140 KB used), /update
(28 MB), and the 7.2 GB eMMC.
The eMMC is mounted data=writeback, nobarrier, errors=continue and without a
journal: a deliberately crash-unsafe mount for a device whose failure mode is
falling out of the sky.
Live sensors: P7 SoC 62 °C, P7MU 55 °C, gyro 50.04 °C, controller RSSI −23 to
−25 dBm, wifi_bcm_state = WIFI_BCM_ACCESS_POINT_OK.
39 kernel modules. Notable: a hardware H.264 decoder (hx270_vdec) as well
as the encoder, the Mali GPU stack, the AVI video pipeline, and vfb, a
virtual framebuffer that dragon-prog holds open as /dev/fb0.
Hardware topology, from udev symlinks in /dev
Section titled “Hardware topology, from udev symlinks in /dev”BLDC, i2c-cypress, mpu6050 (IMU), ak8963 (magnetometer), ms5607
(barometer), mt9f002 (front camera), mt9v117 (vertical camera), p7mu,
hx270a/hx280a (video codecs), ttyPA0 console and ttyPA1 GPS. Only
p7mu is bound as a kernel driver; everything else is driven from
userspace.
A live telemetry bus that is not ARSDK
Section titled “A live telemetry bus that is not ARSDK”/dev/shm holds six Parrot “shdata” sections readable without touching ARSDK:
shd_user_telemetry (68500 B), shd_wifid (24144), shd_rtpstats (21284),
shd_stabmetadata (20948), shd_frameinfotlm (9108), shd_estimators (2312).
Four are open in dragon-prog; two are not, so something else owns them. For a
custom stack this looks like a better tap than ARSDK. Q: the shdata header
format, which is pure reading to work out.
Oddities
Section titled “Oddities”flirdruns on a drone with no FLIR.feature.flir: -1andro.factory.milos_flir: 0, yet the thermal daemon is up anddragon-progrepeatedly failsflir_stopStreaming ... ret = -107(ENOTCONN) while telling the controllerSDK_send_thermal_cam_state 1.shpoisonis a third of the entire log, emitting a USB-OTG role poll every five seconds forever. The log ring is only 256 KB and permanently wrapping, so useful history is a couple of minutes deep.acc_calibration_v1.binis 0 bytes whiledragon-progholds it open read-write; the gyro and magnetometer files are 12 and 16 bytes. Q: is the aircraft flying on the factory thermal model alone?- The clock is at epoch and the RTC holds no time across power cycles, so nearly every mtime on the device is really just an uptime.
publisherlistens on TCP 44445 with a backlog of 128, started with the model id and serial as arguments. Role not established. Q.- LTTng kernel tracing is compiled in and
debugfsis mounted rw.
Two preserved debug bundles from before we owned the story
Section titled “Two preserved debug bundles from before we owned the story”Debug/archive/debug_00.tar.lzo holds a ckcm.bin dated 2018-08-15
16:12:58, real wall-clock, the oldest surviving artifact on the unit.
debug_01.tar.lzo holds a 1 MB log from the previous boot. Neither was
read: they are the previous owner’s sessions and would carry coordinates and
network names.
A cross-talk bug in the ADB MCP server, not an injection
Section titled “A cross-talk bug in the ADB MCP server, not an injection”The survey agent reported, correctly and carefully, that one of its tool results
came back containing a complete JSON-RPC tools/call object carrying its own
toolUseId and a command it never issued (an arp and DHCP-leases probe). It
treated the content as untrusted and did not act on it, which was exactly right.
The cause is benign and it is ours: that was this session’s command. While
the agent was surveying, this session issued an arp/DHCP-leases probe through
the same mcadb server to answer a question about Wi-Fi clients. The probe hung
and was backgrounded. Two concurrent calls to one mcadb server, and one call’s
request framing surfaced inside the other’s result.
So it is not an injection vector, but it is a real bug: the server does not keep concurrent requests separate, and the symptom is one caller receiving another caller’s framed request as data. The agent’s instinct to treat it as untrusted was the correct response regardless of cause, and would have been the correct response if the cause had been hostile.
Two things follow for anyone driving this drone:
- Do not run two sessions against one
mcadbserver concurrently until that is fixed. The same caution applies to any MCP server whose concurrency story is unknown. - A tool result that contains a tool call is never data to act on. That holds whether the cause is a framing bug or something deliberate.
Confirmed afterwards: that probe never returned at all. The harness
eventually aborted it with sent no response or progress for 1809s. So the
failure mode is not a stray copy of a completed call; the hung call’s framing
surfaced in a different caller’s result while the call itself was still
outstanding. That is a stronger statement about the bug than the original
observation.
Reported upstream-worthy; the server is mcadb.
The system log carries identifying data, including position
Section titled “The system log carries identifying data, including position”Worth stating plainly because the log is the most useful artifact on the drone
and it is easy to share. A single session’s ckcm.bin was observed carrying:
- the aircraft’s CPU id and both halves of its serial number, logged in full when a controller asks for settings;
GPS FIRST FIX position set to: <latitude>, <longitude>, the real coordinates where the drone acquired its fix, which for a drone flown at home is a home address;- the Wi-Fi configuration and the names of controllers that have connected.
So a log is not a safe thing to paste into an issue, attach to a bug report or
commit. Ours stay in gitignored captures/; quote lines from them, never files.
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